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This Special Issue focuses on the European Union’s (EU) responses to the sovereign debt crisis and 
analyses the impact these have had thus far on welfare state reforms. EU austerity policy, although 
preventing default and re-assuring the financial markets in the short term, may lead to substantial 
policy, institutional or paradigmatic change in the welfare states in the longer term (Hall, 1993) and thus 
deserves thorough analysis. The global financial crisis which started in 2007 and the ensuing ’Great 
Recession’  has already sparked a number of publications analysing the responses of governments to the 
far-reaching global recession as well as the impact these responses have had thus far on welfare states. 
Some of the recent literature highlights distinctive features of the on-going recession, including, first, 
the international origins and global impact of the crisis (Farnsworth and Irving, 2011; Bermeo and 
Pontusson, 2012; Greve, 2012), but the role of the EU in crisis responses has not per se been in the 
spotlight. Second, while the fiscal response to the crisis in the 1970s primarily involved increases in 
government spending, in the current recession, governments have relied predominantly on tax cuts to 
stimulate the economy and on spending cuts to achieve fiscal consolidation (Bermeo and Pontusson, 
2012). The patterns of response thus follow recent paths of institutional welfare state change, although 
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Keynesian crisis responses were adopted to some degree following the immediate outbreak of the crisis 
(Vis et al., 2011; Hemerijck, 2012). These new paths include the development of employment at the 
margins, which re-enforces patterns of labour market dualization, toughening access to unemployment 
and other benefits, as well as curtailing public expenditure in the areas of health care, pensions and 
education (Bermeo and Pontusson, 2012; Bonoli and Natali, 2011; Emmenegger et al., 2012; Greve, 
2012; Hemerijck, 2012). Third, mainstream theory – e.g. the ’Varieties of Capitalism’ and ‘Worlds of 
Welfare’ literature - does not sufficiently account for these institutional welfare state developments or 
for variation in responses to the crisis, let alone the different responses to this recession compared to 
previous economic downturns.  
The Great Recession has hit the Eurozone’s soft spot, that is, the interdependent, yet asymmetric 
economies which have pooled monetary policy while fiscal policy remains decided at national level 
(Scharpf, 2011). The EU’s response to this situation – first and foremost fiscal consolidation - and the 
impact this is having on welfare state reform deserves more in-depth analysis.  This Special Issue 
analyses how EU policy has developed throughout the crisis and the mechanisms through which EU 
instruments have affected welfare state reforms in the Member States most severely hit by the crisis. 
These countries, mainly in the European periphery, have seen soaring rates of public debt, leading to a 
sovereign debt crisis in which it became difficult or impossible to re-finance public debt without the 
assistance of the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
The scale of the crisis and the EU response to it 
In order to understand the EU responses, it is important to recall the severe crisis context in which these 
new tools of EU governance were developed. Starting off as a ‘sub-prime’ mortgage and banking crisis in 
the US in 2007, the crisis quickly became global and also spread to the European financial sector.  The 
first countries affected by the crisis were countries where financial regulation was weak (Bermeo and 
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Pontusson, 2012). These include liberal market economies, but also the southern EU countries and some 
central and eastern European countries.  From autumn 2008 onwards, the effects of the financial crisis 
on the real economy became apparent as economic growth was declining and unemployment was rising 
in Europe. By 2009/10, the average unemployment rate in the EU stood at 9 per cent and reached peaks 
of as high as 20 per cent (in Spain and Latvia) with youth unemployment climbing over 20 per cent 
throughout the EU (and even over 40 per cent in Spain) (Eurostat data). With rising unemployment 
levels, the pressure on national welfare budgets increased while at the same time fewer resources were 
available due to negative economic growth and declining tax revenue, rapidly shifting the fiscal balance 
into deficits. In combination with large rescue packages to prop up the banking sector to prevent a 
collapse of financial institutions and a wider economic meltdown, many euro area countries breached 
the deficit rule of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (stipulating a maximum public deficit of 3% of 
GDP) and had soaring rates of public debt.  
 
As a consequence, international credit ratings agencies considerably downgraded the credit status of 
several euro zone countries, sometimes to as low as ‘junk’, sparking fears of individual member states’ 
bankruptcy with a potential domino effect on other countries in the Euro area (Scharpf, 2011). The 
biggest fear was that if there was a precedent of Euro exit, investors would become too nervous to lend 
to other Eurozone countries with the result of a substantial increase in interest rates that would, in turn, 
bring further troubled Eurozone economies to the brink of bankruptcy with the ultimate threat of other 
countries leaving the Eurozone and a break-up of the common currency altogether. To prevent such 
contagion and to restore confidence in the Euro, joint and swift action became indispensable.  
The EU and the ECB, together with the IMF offered full or partial financial rescue packages to the most-
troubled countries through loans and other types of conditionality (Sacchi, in this issue), starting with a 
bailout of Greece in Spring 2010. Ireland required financial assistance in late 2010 and Portugal in Spring 
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2011. They are the only three countries that have signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) that 
require radical austerity measures and structural reforms, monitored intensely, in exchange for financial 
support. In late 2012, Spain sought a nearly €40 billion rescue package from the EU to stabilise its 
struggling banking sector, but avoided a full state bailout. The latest country to seek financial assistance 
from the EU was Cyprus in April 2013. At around the same time new fears were sparked that Italy could 
no longer repay its public debt.  As a response to that, the ECB bought up Italian government bonds on 
secondary sovereign bond markets, but on the condition to implement a strict course of action, 
including welfare reforms, to promote growth and to balance the budget by 2013, (Sacchi, in this issue; 
de la Porte and Natali, 2014). At EU level, several decisions were taken rapidly that aimed at 
strengthening the SGP and thus correcting existing economic imbalances, while also preventing future 
debt crises. These put indirect, but strong pressure on welfare states with an emphasis on structural 
reforms. The articles in this Special Issue examine to what extent changes have taken place due to the 
particular crisis conditions at the European Union and national levels. 
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Contributions to this Special Issue and their main findings 
In the article “A new era of European Integration? Governance of labour market and social policy since 
the sovereign debt crisis” , Caroline de la Porte and Elke Heins develop a typology of EU integration to 
capture with what objectives and through which surveillance and enforcement mechanisms new 
instruments affecting labour market and social policy have been developed throughout the crisis. It is 
shown that the governance of the EMU has been altered via a process of institutional ‘layering’ whereby 
new mechanisms are grafted onto the pre-existent institutional frameworks. Through these alterations, 
the nature of EU intervention into domestic welfare states has changed, with an enhanced focus on 
fiscal consolidation, while other aims such as social equity have only recently re-gained attention on the 
EU agenda via softer governance methods. Furthermore, this new style of EU intervention in welfare 
states is associated with increased surveillance and a higher degree of enforcement, which represents a 
radical alteration in EU integration. 
The article by Sotiria Theodoropoulou entitled “National social and labour market policy reforms in the 
shadow of EU bail-out conditionality: The cases of Greece and Portugal” scrutinizes the intrusive role of 
the EU and the IMF in pensions, labour markets and collective bargaining in Greece and Portugal. In 
both cases financial assistance was provided conditionally, as detailed in MoUs, in exchange for 
structural reforms. The two cases show that despite very high intrusiveness of MoUs due to tough 
conditionality and active surveillance in both countries, there were notable differences, with more 
radical policy intervention and more far-reaching reforms in Greece than in Portugal. The comparative 
analysis shows that the policy agenda embodied in the MoUs was to enhance fiscal consolidation via 
radical reforms under conditions of pervasive austerity, which has led to radical retrenchment of the 
Greek and Portuguese welfare states.  
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The article “From austerity to permanent strain? The EU and welfare state reform in Italy and Spain” by 
Emmanuele Pavolini, Margarita León, Ana Guillén and Ugo Ascoli analyses the altered impact of the EU 
on the two largest Southern European welfare states in the wake of the crisis. While the two countries 
avoided a formal bail-out, they nevertheless came under the shadow of conditionality. A longitudinal 
analysis across different policy areas highlights that both were following different paths pre-crisis, with 
Spain having made more investments to meet new social risks, while in Italy such reforms were 
envisaged but not enacted. From mid-2010 onwards, mounting pressure from the EU led to reforms 
adopted rapidly, which represents a retrenchment phase in both welfare states. The authors 
conceptualise this reform dynamic as a new ‘age of permanent strain’, characterized by extreme haste, 
intense tensions, growing anxiety among the population and growing public unrest. 
The article “Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in the sovereign 
debt crisis” by Stefano Sacchi focuses on the altered nature of conditionality in the Italian case. He 
argues that conditionality, although informal, can be extremely strong in terms of policy specificity as 
well as surveillance, but weak along the enforcement dimension. He convincingly shows that market 
forces are the important causal factor intervening in enforcement of policies prompted by the EU. The 
article also shows the use of ad-hoc informal conditionality empowered the economically-oriented 
actors, especially the Directorate General of Economic and Financial Affairs and the European Central 
Bank. 
Fiona Dukelow in her article “’Pushing against an open door’: reinforcing the neo-liberal policy paradigm 
in Ireland and the impact of EU intrusion” argues that austerity measures demanded by the EU/IMF in 
return for large-scale financial support were drastic, but that they did not constitute a change in social 
policy direction in Ireland. She shows that the recommendations made through the MoUs were 
welcome by political elites and representatives of business and that paradoxically the EU-IMF induced 
reforms even strengthened the neo-liberal paradigm that has been underpinning the Irish welfare state 
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for decades. The empirical evidence is striking and the theoretical contribution highlights that paradigms 
can be re-enforced under crisis circumstances, rather than being altered.  
The article “Still the sound of silence? Towards a new phase in the Europeanization of welfare state 
policies in France” by Patrick Hassenteufel and Bruno Palier analyses the EU influence on welfare 
reforms in France. Through a longitudinal perspective the authors find that reforms in the areas of 
pensions, health care and labour markets are increasingly taken in line with EU prerogatives. The 
authors argue that there are changes compared to before the crisis since the need for deficit reduction 
is now explicitly integrated into French political discourses and policies and the EU is able to demand 
evidence of reform. The authors also show that France has maintained leverage regarding the timing 
and content of the reforms.   However, overall, the implication is that the EU is much more involved in 
welfare state reforms than before the crisis. 
In “A Framework for Social Investment Strategies: Integrating generational, life course, and gender 
perspectives in the EU social investment strategy” Jon Kvist argues that the Social investment strategy 
developed at European level holds the promise of renewing the European Social Model in the aftermath 
of the crisis although the gender dimension has been overlooked in this context. Kvist offers a 
comprehensive life-course perspective on social investment that shows how the strategy is based on a 
generational contract combined with horizontal redistribution. The life course perspective also focuses 
attention to the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of social investments and cumulative effects 
over time. In an illustrative comparative study combining the life-course perspective with a gender 
perspective on social investment, Kvist points to some of the key gender dimensions that need to be 
addressed by appropriate policies to optimize the formation, maintenance and use of human capital in 
both economic and non-economic spheres by men and women.  
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Despite (soft) EU pressure to reform welfare states in line with social investment policies it is doubtful, 
however, that all countries can afford and implement all the necessary institutional reforms to harvest 
the long-term returns.  As the contributions in this issue demonstrate, some of the countries most in 
need of welfare reforms are worst positioned to undertake such reform due to the impact of the crisis 
on these countries.   
 
Notes 
 The idea for this Special Issue emerged at the annual ESPAnet conference in 2012, where first drafts of 
many of the papers were presented. A subsequent workshop in May 2013, supported by the 
Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark, gave us the opportunity to discuss all 
of the papers. We would like to thank various colleagues for their valuable comments, in particular 
Jonah Levy, Nathalie Morel and Joakim Palme.    
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